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Abstract
With regard to moral judgments. Lawrence Kohlberg claimed that reason
and logic lead to answers about right and wrong. By contrast, Jonathan
Haidt proposed an “emotivist” theory of morality in which feelings take
center stage. I tested Haidt’s theory of moral judgment by showing 59
college undergraduate participants an abortion video while instructing them
to increase, decrease, or make no attempt to change their level of emotion
during the video. I found that the video succeeded at both increasing
negative emotions (particularly disgust) and changing abortion attitudes to a
more pro-life stance. Furthermore, the moral views of participants asked to
down-regulate emotions by viewing the video analytically were less affected
by the video. Implications and methodological problems are discussed.
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Moral Emotion Regulation: The Case of Abortion Attitudes
A Philosophical Divide
A tradition extending back to ancient Greece identified morality with
rationality, implying that moral judgments were based on logic. Western
religion capitalized on this way of thinking; for example, Thomas Aquinas
used Aristotelian logic in an attempt to justify religious morality.
David Hume, a Scottish thinker and a product of the enlightenment,
questioned the significance of rationality in morality. According to Hume,
it is impossible “from reason alone … to distinguish betwixt moral good and
evil” (Hume, 1740/2000, p. 457). As an empiricist, Hume thought that
reason, at best, could inform us of the means to achieve an end, but that
reason had no place deciding the end in question. For Hume, emotion fills
this normative void; through emotion, we can structure our preferences for
achieving goals (Morris, 2001).
Hume’s observations led him to believe that sympathy for humanity
guides most people’s actions, for reason (i.e., rationality) does not allow us
to make the logical leap from statements about what people do to statements
about what people should do. Reason can only provide statements of the
former type. We need goals to obtain statements of the latter type, and
Hume thought that these goals were motivated by emotion (Cohon, 2004).
Immanuel Kant (1787) argued against Hume’s moral philosophy.
According to Kant, Hume’s theory only described “hypothetical
imperatives”—duties contingent upon certain goals. However, according to
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Kant, Hume ignored “categorical imperatives”—duties that are present
regardless of one’s goals. Kant suggested that we need to use reason to
arrive at categorical imperatives because they are not goal oriented—they
are not dependent upon someone’s whims or desires, and are instead
universal. Furthermore, he described a multi-step process to reason the
morality of an action: propose an action, picture that action as a rule guiding
all rational beings, and then decide whether you would will everyone to do
what you are about to do (Johnson, 2004). For instance, Kant believed that
people should never lie because he pictured a world in which everybody lied
and determined that this world was the worst possible world that could exist
– nobody would ever want a world in which everybody lied. Therefore,
according to him, we should never lie. Kant understood that people felt
emotion at moral actions, but unlike Hume, he determined that emotion was
a consequence of the action and not a cause.
Kantian and Humean insights on emotion and reason in morality
have influenced 20th century psychological thinkers, among them Lawrence
Kohlberg. Kohlberg tried to map the development of moral reasoning in
boys by interviewing them about what a character should do given certain
hypothetical dilemmas. For instance, in one dilemma, Heinz’s wife is near
death, the only cure available is a drug sold by a specific druggist, Heinz
does not have enough money to buy the drug, and the druggist is unwilling
to lower the price of the drug to accommodate Heinz. The only way that
Heinz could save his wife is to steal the drug. Kohlberg told the boys that
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Heinz stole the drug, asked the boys if Heinz should or should not have
stolen the drug (and why), and then asked the boys if he should or should
not be punished for stealing the drug (and why) (Rest, 1986 as cited in
Anderson, 2004). Kohlberg cared not about what decisions the boys made
but the moral reasoning used to reach those decisions. For instance, one boy
could have said that Heinz should have stolen the drug because it is nice to
help people, while another boy could have said that Heinz should not have
stolen the drug because it is not nice to steal. Kohlberg thought that the
reasoning behind the decision (e.g. “it is nice to do this” or “it is not nice to
do that”) indicated the moral stage, not the decision itself.
Through interviews with the boys, Kohlberg created a stage theory
of moral decisions in which the “moral stage” corresponds to the highest
level of moral thinking that the boy engages in his reasoning. According to
Kohlberg, as a child develops more mature moral reasoning processes by
engaging with his environment, he develops the skills to make universal
moral decisions based on logic rather than fear of punishment. Moreover,
Kohlberg set his stage theory so that his highest level of moral reasoning
corresponds to the ideal Kantian processes of making moral decisions, such
as universal rules, logical reasoning, and perspective taking (Krebs &
Denton, 2005).
Rationalism Challenged: Hume’s Return
The study of cognitive processes has dominated psychology since
the 1960s, so it is no surprise that Kohlberg’s cognitive/rationalist theories
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dominated moral psychology between 1960 and 1980. However, in the late
1970s and 1980s, experiments revealed a significant amount of nonconscious processes in cognition. For example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977)
reviewed a study in which people who memorized the word pair ‘oceanmoon’ were more likely to suggest Tide when asked for a detergent;
however, when the participants were asked why they responded with Tide,
they did not mention the words that they had to memorize - they made up
other plausible reasons (for instance, “I like the Tide box” (p. 243)). When
asked if the memory task might have elicited the response, only one-third of
the participants thought it possible. This review called into question the
legitimacy of introspection as a way to understand cognitive processes.
Furthermore, automatic processes have been implicated in linguistics:
people can easily decide whether or not a sentence is grammatical without
being able to say why (Anderson, 2004).
A more relevant challenge to rationalist moral psychology came in
Haidt’s (2001) paper, entitled “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” The main goal of this
paper was to outline and defend a model of moral judgments based on
intuition rather than reasoning1. The basis of Haidt’s model is emotion; he
proposed that emotion determines moral judgments by activating moral

1

Haidt (2001) defined intuition as something that occurs “quickly,
effortlessly, and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is
accessible to consciousness” (p. 6) contrasted with reason, which occurs
“more slowly, requires some effort, and requires at least some steps that are
accessible to consciousness” (p. 6).
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intuitions. (Haidt recognized that occasionally, personal characteristics and
knowledge would sometimes cause people to think rationally about a moral
judgment. People will sometimes mull over a decision that they have made,
especially if they do not feel a strong emotion either way; therefore, he
allowed a place for reason in his chain of moral reasoning, but it occurs at
the end of the chain and only under very specific circumstances.)
Outlined briefly below is Haidt’s Social Intuitive Model (SIM) along
with evidence supporting each of the first four links in the chain. The fifth
and sixth links are concessions to rationalist models, and they are only
briefly described here (for a more complete description, see Haidt, 2001;
also, see Figure 1 for a diagram).
1. The Intuitive Judgment Link: When confronted with a moral
dilemma, a controversial issue, or a transgression, it is assumed that
everyone has an immediate emotional reaction and a rightness or wrongness
intuition. These intuitions occur well before any conscious reasoning can
take place.
Supporting this step, Haidt cited studies in which participants
evaluated stimuli as positive or negative as soon as those stimuli were
presented, well before any conscious deliberation could have taken place
(Zajonc, 1980, as cited in Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, several studies have
demonstrated that emotions correlate with moral decisions (e.g. Moll et al.,
2002; Greene, 2001), with one study showing that inducing a negative mood
in a participant will lead him or her to make harsher judgments than
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inducing a positive mood in the participant (Forgas & Moylan, 1987). This
suggests that emotion may precede and contribute to moral decisions.
2. The Post Hoc Reasoning Link: After a person automatically
makes a decision regarding his or her moral position on an issue, he or she
searches for reasons supporting the decision that he or she has just made.
This step is effortful as contrasted with the easy and automatic decisionmaking step. Anderson (2004) suggested that even though the reasoning
occurs after the judgment, the person making the judgment might still think
that the reasoning occurred first.
Supporting this step, Haidt cited several research studies (e.g. Kuhn,
1991; Kunda, 1990) concluding that “everyday reasoning is heavily marred
by the biased search only for reasons that support one’s already-stated
hypothesis” (p. 818); however, as far back as Festinger (1957), studies have
shown that a need for consistency can cause people to change their
cognitions in response to their own behavior.
3. The Reasoned Persuasion Link: After people decide the
reasoning for their viewpoints, they will try to use his or her newly created
reasons to persuade others of their opinions. Haidt theorized that even
though people might try to use logic to persuade other people to accept their
moral positions, the most successful avenue of persuasion is through affect.
Supporting this step, Haidt cited research demonstrating that
attitudes are most responsive to change through affective means (e.g.,
Edwards & von Hippel, 1995; Shavitt, 1990, both as cited in Haidt, 2001).

7
If the intuitive judgment link and post hoc reasoned link occur in the
suggested order (i.e. people have initial, affective reactions and then decide
their reasons post hoc), then moral attitudes are affectively based, so
methods of changing affect would best serve to change moral attitudes.
4. The Social Persuasion Link: As the model indicates, some of the
links in this moral judgment sequence may be bypassed as a result of social
persuasion. Someone might decide how he or she feels about an issue not
by the arguments being presented but by the position of the persuader
relative to the person being persuaded. For example, think of President
Bush’s reaction to Al Gore’s movie “An Inconvenient Truth,” or the
Republican (or Democrat) response to Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 9-11.”
These movies were universally supported by their respective political party,
and unsupported by the opposing party, not because of the arguments
presented but because of the people making the arguments.
The power of social persuasion was elegantly demonstrated by the
research of Soloman Asch (1956). Asch showed how individuals are
influenced to conform when confronted with a consensus attitude in a group.
The individuals can be as close as loved ones (Davis & Rusbult, 2001), but
they can also be as distant as classroom peers (Newcomb, 1943). Moreover,
the more respected the individuals who hold these beliefs, the greater the
degree of persuasion and conformity they foster among observers.
5. The Reasoned Judgment Link: Rarely, a person can actually
reason his or her way to a judgment through logic. This process serves as
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the basis for the Kohlbergian model, but Haidt claims that this only happens
when the person has weak intuitions and has the time and cognitive
resources necessary for reflection. As mentioned by Haidt (2001),
philosophers might use the fifth link of his chain. Furthermore, if the person
does have a strong intuition in one direction and he or she reasons his or her
way to another decision, the latter might be expressed in words while the
former might manifest itself under the surface.
6. The Private Reflection Link: Also, rarely, a person might use role
playing or perspective taking to activate a new intuition supporting a
different moral judgment. If several, competing intuitions are strong, then
the person might pick the strongest of the intuitions or use an abstract
principle to decide his or her moral reasoning.
In summary, Haidt allows that reason and emotion can both affect
moral judgments, but it is clear that he finds emotional determinants to be
stronger, leading other scholars to critique his theory.
Pizzaro and Bloom (2003) critiqued Haidt’s theory, focusing on the
order of the stages and the relative centrality of the fifth and sixth stages
compared to the others. For instance, they agreed that intuitions shape
moral decisions; however, they thought that prior moral reasoning initiated
intuitions. Moreover, they proposed that if people wanted to change their
emotional reaction to an event, they could learn to react differently to the
event over time – they could cognitively control their reaction. In a
published response to these scholars, Haidt (2003) agreed that people could
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sometimes change the way they felt about an issue. However, he pointed out
that most changes in intuitive reactions (spurred, often, by social influence,
the fourth link in his chain) occur because we try to “morally mesh” (p. 197)
with people whom we consider to have similar (not contrary) points of view.
As an attempt to refute Haidt’s claim, Pizzaro and Bloom pointed out a
study in which students with implicit racism2 attended a class to lessen their
implicit stereotyping (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). However, Haidt
replied that the students attended the class not because they wanted to
override their initial reactions, but because they hated racism and wanted to
be around other people who also hated racism, suggesting that people rarely
seek out challenges to their original intuitions.
Saltzstein and Kasachoff (2004) criticized Haidt for downplaying the
role of reasoning in moral decision making. They offered a compromise
between Kohlberg and Haidt, claiming that “sometimes [intuitions] are the
result of our moral beliefs” (p. 276). They argued that many times people
have no intuitions about certain issues (they used cloning pets or using
aborted fetuses for medical research as examples of when that happens), so
they reason their way to the moral decision, and their reasoning shapes their
intuitions. Supporting this claim, they cited research on systematic vs.

2

An example of implicit racism is the Implicit Association Test (IAT),
where participants might express a certain outward belief (e.g. African
Americans are just as good as Caucasians), but when tested for speed on a
computer, the participants respond slower to African American faces paired
with positive adjectives than to Caucasians faces paired with positive
adjectives, suggesting that African Americans and positive adjectives are
incongruous (Greenwald et al., 1998).
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heuristic processing (Kelman, 1961 as cited in Saltzstein & Kasachoff,
2004), central vs. peripheral routes to persuasion3 (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979,
as cited in Saltzstein & Kasachoff, 2004) and their own research on
heteronomous vs. autonomous changes in moral judgments4 (Saltzstein et al,
2004 as cited in Saltzstein & Kasachoff, 2004). These studies suggest that
moral persuasion could arrive peripherally through automatic processes (i.e.,
emotion first, then reasoning as in the Haidt paper) or centrally through
deliberate processes (i.e., reasoning first, then emotion, as in Kohlberg).
Haidt (2004) responded forcefully to Saltztein and Kasachoff’s
(2004) critique of his model, claiming that Saltzstein and Kasachoff
critiqued a simplified view of his model wherein intuition shapes judgment,
which then, in turn, shapes reasoning. Haidt commented that Saltzstein and
Kasachoff forgot the most important aspect of the model: the social aspect,
wherein people use their reasons to persuade other people, and in turn are
persuaded by other people’s reasons. As Haidt suggested, “ordinary people
do not spontaneously look for evidence on both sides of a judgment
question. People engage in moral reasoning not so much to figure things out

3

The central route of persuasion is when somebody considers the pros and
cons of a particular issue before he or she decides his or her opinion, while
the peripheral route of persuasion is when somebody “makes a inference
about the merits of the advanced position based on simple cues in the
persuasion context” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, p. 135). An example of the
peripheral route of persuasion is agreeing with somebody just because he or
she is an expert.
4
Heteronomous changes in moral judgments occur when a child changes
moral beliefs partly because of obedience to adult authority, whereas
autonomous changes in moral judgments occur when a child decides his or
her opinion of a moral issue by himself or herself.
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for themselves, in private, but to influence others” (p. 284). Indeed, Haidt
asserted that links 3 and 4 of his chain influence people in different ways;
link 3 (the reasoned persuasion link) can influence people through reason,
while link 4 (the social persuasion link) can influence people through social
compliance. However, even in central vs. peripheral routes to persuasion,
most people at most times use the peripheral route because it takes less
effort; furthermore, as William James (1902/1906) noted, “[reason] will fail
to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb intuitions are opposed
to its conclusions” (p. 74).
Saltzstein and Kasachoff (2004) also argued that “in the absence of
any statement of possible empirical counterevidence, one might well
conclude that the proposal offered by Haidt is not empirically
disconfirmable and, thus, also not empirically verifiable” (p. 279).
However, Haidt (2001) cited studies that linked deficits of moral emotions
and tendencies towards psychopathy (Cleckley, 1955 as cited in Haidt,
2001), that linked psychopathy with atrophied regions of the brain thought
to control emotion (e.g. Mednick et al., 1982, Raine et al., 1994, and
Damasio, 1994 as cited in Haidt, 2001), and that showed no link between an
ability to know the right moral lifestyle and the practice of that lifestyle
(Damasio, 1994 as cited in Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, recent studies have
demonstrated that differences in moral judgments can occur without
differences in the arguments being presented. For example, Wheatley and
Haidt (2005 as cited in Haidt & Bjorklund, 2005) found that hypnotizing
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groups to feel disgust at certain words made their moral judgments more
severe than non-hypnotized control groups when those words were included
in the moral statement, but there was no difference when those words were
not included in the moral statement. Moreover, many hypnotized
participants rated a non-moral situation as morally wrong when the disgustinducing words were included in the statement. Even when the disgust did
not relate to the moral situation at all, by having students sit next to a filthy
or clean table, “some subjects [when seated at the filthy desk]…judged the
scenarios to be worse than subjects seated at the clean desk” (Schnall, Haidt,
& Clore, 2005 as cited in Prinz, 2004).
As a strong indicator of intuitions shaping moral judgments, Haidt,
Bjorklund and Murphy (2005 as cited in Haidt & Bjorklund, 2004)
demonstrated that for a behavior that induces disgust (e.g. incestuous sex),
even with countervailing reasons (e.g. the couple used multiple forms of
contraception and felt no ill emotional aftereffects), people still thought that
the act was wrong. The experimenter would ask the participants why the act
was wrong, and the participants would continue to give reasons. Even when
the experimenter satisfied all of the participants’ reasons for thinking that
the act was wrong, the participants still insisted that it had to be wrong.
Why was it wrong? It was wrong because it was wrong; the participants
could not think of any more reasons. Haidt et al. (2005) called this
phenomenon “moral dumbfounding,” and used it to suggest that when an
intuition shapes a moral judgment, people will hold onto that judgment even
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when there are no longer reasons for their having that judgment. Therefore,
research by Haidt involving the induction of disgust demonstrated that
intuitions can precede moral judgments, and people often refuse to change
their mind when their moral judgments stem from a strong intuition, even
when there is evidence demonstrating flaws in their reasons for holding
those moral judgments. We hope to replicate these results using emotion
regulation as a way to control participants’ negative emotions to see if moral
judgments are more likely to change without emotionally based intuitions.
Emotion Regulation
Emotions are thought to be an adaptive mechanism to avoid
dangerous situations. Gross (1999) described the adaptive value of fear:
“when we are afraid, our senses are sharpened, our muscles are primed to
move us quickly out of harm’s way, and our cardiovascular system is tuned
to provide increased oxygen and energy to large muscle groups that will be
called upon when we flee” (p. 556). All of these reactions occur without
any cognitive thought, allowing our reaction to bypass our slow, deliberate
cognition. However, often our emotional reactions are uncomfortable and
counterproductive. Negative emotions have developed as a way to avoid
harmful situations, such as when we need to flee immediately from a fearful
bear or avoid drinking bacteria-ridden liquid. However, rarely do we
encounter such dangerous situations. Furthermore, technology has
increased the amount of danger caused by acting on emotional impulse. For
example, “an irritable swipe that once scarcely raised a welt, is now
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translated with the greatest ease into a fatal car accident or gun-related
homicide” (Gross, 1999, p. 558).
Therefore, to deal with modern society, people need to both increase
and decrease positive and negative emotions at certain times. People
attempt to decrease emotions when the emotions “prompt behavioral
responses that are no longer useful” (Gross, 1999, p. 558), as in the man
who shoots someone who irritates him on the highway. People attempt to
increase positive emotions when, for example, someone is depressed but
does not want to come off that way to friends.
According to the “emotion generation model,” people first evaluate
their internal and external cues, these evaluations lead to behavioral,
experiential, and physical responses, and based on the modulation of these
responses, final emotional expression takes place (Gross, 1999). People can
modulate emotions by selecting the situation they encounter, changing the
environment they encounter, choosing the way they attend to aspects of the
environment, changing the way they think about the environment, or trying
to change the expression of the emotions after they occur.
The two most studied emotion regulation strategies are cognitive
reappraisal and suppression. Cognitive reappraisal is defined as changing
the way somebody thinks about the environment to keep unwanted emotions
from happening in the first place, while suppression is defined as attempting
to limit emotional expression after the emotions occur. Through cognitive
reappraisal, a person can either up-regulate his or her emotion (change the
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way he or she labels an object to feel more emotion toward that object) or
down-regulate his or her emotion (change the way he or she labels an object
to feel less emotion toward that object). For negative stimuli, somebody can
up-regulate his or her emotion by imagining things getting worse or by
imagining somebody close to him or her involved in the stimuli.
Conversely, he or she can down-regulate his or her emotion by imagining
things getting better or imagining his or her objective distance from the
stimuli (Gross, 1998). Oshner et al. (2004) tested up-regulation and downregulation strategies, and found that participants generated different
physiological changes (as measured by an fMRI) and different emotional
experiences by up-regulating as compared with down-regulating.
As an attempt at establishing how suppression and reappraisal affect
daily experiences, Gross (2002) used individual differences in an emotional
regulation questionnaire to determine if participants used suppression or
reappraisal to regulate their emotions. He found that use of suppression was
correlated with lower positive emotion experience, lower negative emotion
expression, and higher negative emotion experience (although the
relationship was weak), while the use of reappraisal was correlated with
higher positive emotion experience and lower negative emotion experience.
Moreover, Gross (1998) tested cognitive reappraisal and suppression with
items that elicited disgust in an American population. He found that
reappraisal decreased the participants’ expressive behavior and overall
perception of disgust, while suppression intensified physiological reaction
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without changing perception. These results suggest that if participants
reappraise a situation so as to experience less negative emotion, they will
indeed experience less negative emotion, whereas if participants only
suppress their feelings, they might not change their experience or they might
actually experience greater negative emotion.
Moral Emotions and General Thesis of the Current Study
Given an ability to regulate emotional reactions, how might changes
in emotional reaction influence moral judgments?. Tangney, Stuewig, and
Mashek (2006) divided moral emotions into two kinds: inwardly projected
moral emotions (e.g., shame, guilt) and outwardly projected moral emotions
(e.g., anger, disgust). Although inwardly directed emotions might influence
outward moral judgments, not enough research has examined the
association, so we instead focus on outwardly directed moral emotions.
Rozin et al. (1999) classified three outwardly directed, negatively valenced
emotions; furthermore, they found that each of these emotions corresponded
to one of Shweder et al.’s (1997) ethics5. According to their Contempt
Anger Disgust (CAD) triad hypothesis, people experience contempt when
someone violates standards of their community (e.g. a violation of
expectations relating to social hierarchy), people experience anger when
someone violates their autonomy (e.g. violations of rights), and people
experience disgust when someone violates their divinity (e.g. reminders of
our animal nature, including seeing a rotting body). Even though Rozin et
5

See Shweder et al.’s (1997) for a more complete description of autonomy
codes, community codes, and divinity codes.
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al. (1999) noted that “the divinity code is so foreign to the moral system
used by educated Americans that most of [his] participants assigned … such
violations to the nonmoral category” (p. 581), Goldenberg et al. (2001)
found that people who were reminded of their own mortality exhibited
higher levels of disgust at animal things than people who did not have the
same primes. Furthermore, Rozin et al. (1997) found that many American
vegetarians (who became vegetarians for moral reasons) exhibited a high
level of disgust at meat. Moreover, if we consider the antigay agenda of
many Evangelicals, the recent uproar over the husband of Terri Schaivo and
the court system allowing her to die, and the abortion debate, we find that
people do sometimes use the divine as a source of their moral judgments,
and therefore, possibly exhibit disgust as part of the justification.
Therefore, if Haidt’s thesis holds, and moral judgments are
instigated by emotional reactions, then people who feel more anger,
contempt, and/or disgust at a situation should judge the situation as more
morally wrong than people who do not feel those emotions. Furthermore,
because Gross (1998) has provided evidence of the efficacy of emotional
regulation as a way of controlling emotional reaction to a stimulus, emotion
regulation should provide a way of experimentally manipulating how much
negative emotion participants feel, and consequently, change their moral
judgment of a stimulus. In other words, because cognitive down-regulation
can limit bad emotional experience, people who watch a video designed to
instill negative emotions while down-regulating their emotional reaction
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should feel less of an emotional change than people who do nothing who
up-regulate their emotional reaction. Furthermore, down regulators should
show a smaller change in moral judgment after watching the video.
The Current Study
Abortion is a moral issue, straddling the ethical divide between an
individual’s rights and religious values. Pro-life adherents believe that prochoice sentiment is a consequence of living in an institutionalized and
academic world where people can rationalize almost anything.
Furthermore, according to Gorney (2004), the pro-lifers believe that most
people are complacent, and despite general opposition to unrestricted
abortions (at least in private), most people do not want to rethink a
notoriously political issue. The only way that pro-life supporters think that
they can win the abortion issue is “visuals – literal visuals, to shock people
from complacently; and verbal descriptions that force people to keep
picturing what actually takes place in an abortion-procedure room” (Gorney,
2004, p. 36).
People who are against abortion couch the procedure in emotional
terms: “’If you’re holding that child in your hand, and knowingly killing the
child, you can’t argue any more that it’s not really a human being. You just
can’t do it’” (Keri Folmar, quoted in Gorney, 2004, p. 38). Supporting the
Haidtian moral theory, Keri Folmar did not even describe the reasoning for
her moral opinion. Abortion was just wrong – looking at the child, and then
imagining the child dying right in front of her gave her all the reasons she
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needed. She had an immediate emotional reaction (sadness and disgust),
and then without even citing reasons for holding her view, she insisted that
her view was one everybody would share, emotionally.
The pro-life movement has created videos of partial birth abortions
so that people will come face to face with the gruesome procedure.
Supporters hope that people will feel anger at the doctors, disgust at the
operation, and thus motivation to join them on their crusade to restrict
abortion rights. They created the “Center For Bioethical Reform” and
published videos with titles like “Silent Scream,” “The Hard Truth,” “The
Harder Truth,” “Choice Blues” and more, each video designed to appeal
through emotional images and sounds, and hopefully, persuade people to
become pro-life.
Very few studies have examined the efficacy of these videos or their
method of persuasion. To test their method of persuasion, and
consequently, the accuracy of the first step in Haidt’s model, I showed one
of the videos, “The Harder Truth” to college students. My first hypothesis
was that if college students are affected emotionally by the video, they
should increase their negative emotional reaction and in turn, change their
abortion attitudes to a more pro-life stance. However, to further test the
structure of their attitudes, I also asked participants to differentially regulate
their emotions. My second hypothesis is that people who down-regulated
their emotions would feel less negative moral emotion and consequently
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would change their attitudes less than people who up-regulated or did not
control their emotions.
Method
Participants
I recruited 59 participants (37 males, 21 females) from the Syracuse
University Introductory Psychology applicant pool. Most of the participants
were freshmen (n = 48), but the sample also included a few sophomores (n =
5), juniors (n = 4), and seniors (n = 1). Participants were aged 18 (n = 27),
19 (n = 19), 20 (n = 6), 21 (n = 5), and 22 (n = 1). Most of the participants
were Caucasian (n = 35), with some African Americans and Hispanics (n =
9 and n = 6, respectively). The remaining participants reported other
ethnicities. I assigned participants subject numbers and to one of three
categories according to an online random number generator. Twenty
participants were randomly chosen for the up-regulation condition, 23 for
the down-regulation condition, and 16 for the control condition.
Materials
Each of the participants viewed a video and completed several
questionnaires. The 4 min video “The Harder Truth” released by the Center
for Bioethical Reform depicts recently aborted second and third trimester
fetuses. The film opens with a 4 sec clip of the title over a black screen.
Following the clip, only visual images are used to create persuasive effect;
the video is silent. The film’s website recommends that anyone in 7th grade
and above should be allowed to see the film.
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I used four standardized rating scales in our study and one open
ended questionnaire. The open-ended questionnaire asked participants to
“describe how your emotions changed while watching the video,” “describe
what went through your mind while watching the video,” and “describe how
your inner dialogue changed your emotions.” I wanted to use this
questionnaire as a check to see if our participants followed directions while
watching the video, and to have a qualitative description of our participants’
experiences.
We added two items (disgust and nausea) to the Positive and
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988), as a way to
discretely measure the change in participant disgust as a function of our
video priming manipulation. The original PANAS asked participants to rate
on a scale of 1 (Very Slightly or Not At All) to 5 (Extremely) how intensely
they felt 20 emotions ranging from interested, exited, and happy, to sad and
angry. Watson et al. (1998) found that the PANAS factored onto two
loadings, which they called Positive Affect and Negative Affect. Both
factors correlated highly with previous affect, depression, and anxiety
measures. Furthermore, each factor correlated highly with predicted
measures of positive and negative affect; negative affect correlated with
stress, while positive affect changed based on social activity.
The Abortion Attitudes Questionnaire (Stets & Leik, 1993)
contained 20 questions assessing people’s opinion about abortion. The
questions ranged from strong feelings against abortion (e.g. “Abortion is
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murder”) to rather weak feelings against abortion (e.g. “Abortion after the
third trimester is murder”). The questions were originally rated on a 7-point
scale, but I put the questions on a continuous online scale with 1000
possible responses for each question. The participants were instructed to
move the cursor to how strongly they felt for or against any of the questions.
I changed the scale from a discrete 7-point scale to a continuous scale to
prevent carry-over effects, since the participants completed the scale several
times.
The last two questionnaires, the Bodily Cues Questionnaire (Miller
et al., 1981) and the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John,
2003) were used to check how much the participant pays attention to bodily
cues and how much natural emotional regulation the participant engages in
during his or her day to day experiences. In each of the questionnaires, the
participant rated from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) five and
ten items respectively on each of the specified topics (See Appendix A).
Procedure
Each of the 59 participants entered a small, individual computer
room with low lighting. After they gave written informed consent to
participate, the experimenter asked them to fill out the first PANAS and
explained that they had to mark how they felt each of the emotions “on
average.” The experimenter then put on the computer screen the first
Abortion Attitudes Questionnaire and explained the instructions to the
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participant; the experimenter then left the room and let the participant fill
out the questionnaire in solitude.
When the participant finished the Abortion Questionnaire, the
experimenter read instructions on how the participant should watch the
video. I took, as a prototype of our instructions, the instructions that Gross
(1998) used for his emotion regulation experiment. Our up-regulation
instructions were as follows:
I will show you the video in just a moment. Please view it
very carefully, and make sure to pay attention to the entire
video. In addition, I would like to see how well you can
control the way you view things. Therefore, it is important to
me that as you watch the video, you try your best not to stifle
any emotions you may feel in response to it. Instead, try to
take emotional perspectives relevant to what you're seeing in
the video. Think about what you are seeing in such a way
that you feel a great deal about the situations depicted.
Our down-regulation instructions were as follows:
I will show you the video in just a moment. Please view it
very carefully, and make sure to pay attention to the entire
video. In addition, I would like to see how well you can
control the way you view things.

Therefore, it is very

important to me that you try your best to view this video
from the detached perspective of a medical professional
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learning about a surgical procedure. In other words, as you
watch the video, try to think about it objectively and
analytically rather than personally and emotionally. Think
about what you are seeing in such a way that you don't feel
anything at all.
Our no-regulation (control) instructions were as follows:
I will show you the video in just a moment. Please view it
very carefully and make sure to pay attention to the entire
video.
Following the instructions, I asked the participant to paraphrase the
instructions as a check for understanding, explaining the instructions again
to them if they had misinterpreted them. Then I maximized the size of the
video screen, pushed play on the video (I started exactly 4 seconds into the
video and ended exactly 4 minutes into the video), closed the door, and let
them watch the video alone. After they finished the video, I asked them to
complete the Abortion Attitudes Questionnaire again, then I asked them to
complete the PANAS (instead of average emotion I wanted to know how
much emotion they felt during the video), the Open Ended Questionnaire,
the Bodily Cues Questionnaire, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, and
then a demographics questionnaire in that order. I then dismissed the
participant.
Two weeks following the initial study, I asked each of the
participants to fill out the third PANAS (again, asking how much emotion

25
they felt at the time they filled out the questionnaire) and the third Abortion
Attitudes Questionnaire, each accessed through a link I sent to their e-mail.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
I calculated a total score for the abortion questionnaire summing the
individual questions. I scaled the abortion questionnaire so that each
question ranged from 0 to 1000. I wanted the scale to have as many data
points as possible so that the participant would not be able to remember his
or her previous responses when asked to complete the abortion attitudes
questionnaire for the second and third times. Because there were 20
questions on the questionnaire, the minimum possible score was 0 and the
maximum possible score was 20,000. Certain items were reverse-scored,
such that for each question a higher score related to a more pro-choice
stance, while a lower score related to a more pro-life stance. Therefore, if I
subtracted the total abortion score of the second time from the total abortion
score of the first time, a positive number would indicate that the participant
became more pro-life.
Scores on the initial abortion questionnaire (i.e. the abortion
questionnaire before I showed participants the abortion video) ranged from
138 to 18998. I found that the up-regulation condition scores ranged from
702 to 18928 (M = 13445.5, SD = 5018.15), the down-regulation condition
scores ranged from 3406 to 18410 (M = 12208.70, SD = 4694.44), the noregulation condition scores ranged from 138 to 18742 (M = 12297, SD =
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4787.18). I performed a one-way ANOVA on scores of the initial abortion
questionnaire for condition, and found no effect of condition on initial
abortion score (F = .410, p = .666). This suggests that the initial
randomization for abortion scores worked and that there was no meaningful
difference in abortion attitudes between the groups prior to watching the
abortion video. Thus, any differences in the changes of abortion score
between groups should not have occurred because of differences in initial
abortion attitudes.
On the abortion attitudes questionnaire immediately following the
video, scores in the up-regulation condition ranged from 82 to 19168 (M =
10993.3, SD = 5685.13), scores in the down-regulation condition ranged
from 1310 to 18138 (M = 10915.04, SD = 4991) and scores in the noregulation condition ranged from 126 to 15708 (M = 9778.13, SD =
4448.20). Paired samples t-tests indicated that abortion scores significantly
changed between the initial assessment (before the video) and the second
assessment (after the video) for the entire group of participants (t = 6.592, p
< .001). Furthermore, measures of effect size using Cohen’s d indicated a
moderate change in abortion attitudes (d = .41). Just by watching the video,
the participants became somewhat more pro-life. This indicates that overall,
the video was effective at changing abortion attitudes in the desired
direction.
Not all of our participants completed the two-week follow-up
questionnaire; only 14 out of 20 in the up-regulation condition, 15 out of 23
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in the down-regulation condition, and 12 out of 16 in the no-regulation
condition. This is fewer than I had hoped would; however, I had a server
malfunction and I also had issues with the operating systems of our
participant’s personal computers (they could not fill out the follow-up
questionnaire on a Macintosh).
Results from the follow-up testing indicated that scores in the upregulation condition ranged from 1174 to 19488 (M = 10272.71, SD =
5943.31), scores in the down-regulation condition ranged from 2898 to
16826 (M = 11210.4, SD = 4336.08), while scores in the no-regulation
condition ranged from 154 to 14592 (M = 9212.17, SD = 4509.77). Paired
samples t-tests indicated that abortion scores did not change significantly
between the second assessment (after the video) and the third assessment
(two weeks following the video) for the entire group of participants (t = .454, p = .653). This suggests that the effect of the video was maintained
beyond the short-term memory stage.
Figure 2 displays the mean abortion attitudes by condition. The
slopes of the up-regulation condition and the no-regulation condition appear
to be similar, suggesting that our up-regulation instructions did not lead to
results different from those of the control group instructions. Compared to
the no-regulation condition, the down-regulation condition slope between
time one and time two was less steep, suggesting that our down-regulation
instructions were effective and the participants in the down-regulation
condition did not change their abortion attitudes as much as participants in
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the no-regulation condition. Furthermore, compared to the up-regulation
condition, the down-regulation condition slope between time two and time
three was less negative, suggesting that the video had less of a lasting effect
on those participants who down-regulated their emotions. However,
although the graph suggests an association, it does not provide the precision
needed to assess statistical significance.
Effects of Condition on Abortion Attitudes
I performed several t-tests to assess whether participants in the
down-regulation condition had less of a change in abortion attitudes than
participants in the no-regulation group and participants in the up-regulation
group. I first created a difference score by subtracting the total score on the
second abortion attitudes questionnaire from the total score on the first
abortion attitudes questionnaire for each participant. This new score
represented the total change in abortion attitudes. Because the participant
did not do anything other than watch the video between the two
assessments, the difference between the first and second scores could only
be due to the video and measurement error.
After performing an independent samples t-test comparing the
change in up-regulation abortion attitudes and the change in no-regulation
abortion attitudes, I found no effect for the up-regulation condition
compared with the no regulation condition (t = -.086, p = .932). Because
the variance of the up-regulation condition was significantly greater than the
variance of the no-regulation condition (F = 7.722, p = .009), I believe that
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the reason the up-regulation condition had no effect is that either the
participants did not understand the up-regulation directions or that they had
trouble implementing the up-regulation directions. This could be due to a
disparity between our instructions to feel more emotion toward the video
and a natural tendency to try to limit their emotional experience toward the
video.
I then performed an independent samples t-test comparing the
change in down-regulation abortion attitudes and the change in noregulation abortion attitudes; furthermore, I compared the change in downregulation abortion attitudes and the change in up-regulation abortion
attitudes. I found that the difference between the down-regulation and noregulation conditions approached significance (t = -1.951, p = .059) and the
effect size was rather large (d = .635), while the difference between the
down-regulation and up-regulation conditions was not significant (t = 1.468,
p = .151). Again, I think that the misunderstanding of the up-regulation
condition hid an effect of the difference between up-regulation changes in
abortion attitudes and down-regulation changes in abortion attitudes.
Furthermore, I had very few participants per condition, and if I had more
participants, I would have had more power to detect statistically significant
differences.
Next, I examined the change between abortion attitudes immediately
following the video and abortion attitudes two weeks following the video.
As expected, I found no difference between the up-regulation condition and
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the no-regulation condition (t = .069, p = .946), no difference between the
down-regulation condition and the no-regulation condition (t = .808, p =
.427), and no difference between the down-regulation condition and the noregulation condition (t = -.427, p = .672). However, I also found no
difference between the change of abortion attitudes for the entire group of
participants and 0 (t = -.454, p = .653), suggesting that the attitudes between
the second and third distribution of the questionnaire did not change
significantly. Therefore, for all conditions, the video had a lasting effect on
abortion attitudes that persisted at least two weeks following the video.
Emotion and Abortion Attitudes
I first checked to see if disgust and negative emotions (e.g.
distressed, upset, hostile, and disgusted) changed from before to after the
video. As I predicted, the video significantly changed whether or not our
participants thought they felt both disgust (t = -11.034, p < .001, d = 1.950)
and negative emotions (t = 9.972, p < .001, d = 1.696). I also found that the
number of negative emotions after the video had a significant relationship
with scores on the second abortion attitudes questionnaire (r = -.336).
However, after removing from our data set the participants from the upregulation condition, neither the change in disgust (r = -.086) nor the change
in negative emotions (r = -.099) from the first questionnaire to the second
questionnaire correlated significantly with the participants’ condition.
The lack of a correlation and the very strong emotion change from
before the video to after the video suggest one of two things: either the
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manipulation did not differentially alter disgust and negative emotions or
something prevented participants from expressing this difference in a way
that I could analyze. Because disgust and negative emotions significantly
changed from before the video to after the video, I feel that the video altered
disgust; also, placing our participants in different conditions did almost
significantly change the way they reacted to the video. However, two
qualities of the PANAS prevented us from observing accurate changes in
emotional experience. First, the PANAS only measures gross changes in
emotions; I would have no way of differentiating between small changes in
disgust (e.g. the scale cannot differentiate between a 4.0 and a 4.1). Second,
I may be seeing a ceiling effect; the scale has a maximum level of five.
Since a large majority of our participants gave ratings of “5” on the scale, I
could not tell if participants in the no-regulation condition would have put
down a 8.9 if given the chance while participants in the down-regulation
condition would have put down a 7.2 if given the chance. In addition,
because my hypothesis is that people make judgments about things
intuitively and then rationalize it after, a scale where people judge their own
disgust is an inadequate measure for implicit and automatic reactions. If I
cannot expect participants to know what is persuading them to change their
intuitive reactions, how can I expect participants to accurately describe the
disgust that is initiating those changes? I should have instituted a
physiological measure that could have captured minute changes in
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emotional reactions and prevented the introspective error that might have
resulted from using the PANAS.
The Open Ended Questionnaire
I distributed a questionnaire to document our participants’ perception
of their emotion regulation and how that affected their attitudes toward the
video. Most of the participants in the down-regulation condition found it
difficult to control their emotion to the video. One person wrote, “ I tried to
stay as neutral as possible during the video; however it was impossible,” and
then continued, “it’s one thing to talk about abortions and form opinions on
them; however, after seeing one … it did change my emotions toward
abortions; I now find it disgusting.” Another person explained, “I was
trying to stay detached as instructed but I couldn’t help thinking things to
myself and they were thoughts that matched my emotions, which made it
personal to my beliefs and moral … I wondered how many other
[introductory Psychology] students threw up who saw this because I know I
have a strong stomach but this really disgusts me.”
However, some of the participants used emotion regulation to
successfully lower their emotion toward the video. For instance, one of the
down-regulation participants wrote, “my ‘inner dialogue’ kind of ‘calmed
me down’ because … I was not watching this for pleasure – rather
analytically.” Another person, who had a child, wrote “I told myself that
everyone makes [his or her] own choices and that everything happens for a

33
reason, which made me able to look at the film simply as a procedure. I still
felt uneasy at the end of the film, but oddly almost numb to it.”
Discussion
Main Research Findings
I attempted to evaluate Haidt’s socio-intuitive model of moral
judgments. Furthermore, I wanted to explore the persuasive power of
videos designed to change a person’s moral stance. Thus, I had our
participants regulate their emotions to an abortion video, hypothesizing that
people who down-regulated their emotions would feel less emotion and
consequently, change their abortion attitudes less, than people who upregulated their emotions or people who did not change their emotions.
I found several important effects predicted by our hypotheses. First,
negative emotions negatively correlated with pro-choice abortion attitudes,
and the abortion video both induced negative emotions and had a persistent
effect of changing abortion attitudes (as measured by the abortion
questionnaire) to a more pro-life stance. Furthermore, although our results
were not statistically significant, our findings suggest that people asked to
down-regulate their emotions changed their attitudes less than people not
given that instruction. This is remarkable, considering Kohlberg’s
insistence at presenting his participants with hypothetical and emotionally
distant situations. Kohlberg thought that interviewing the boys, instead of
observing them make moral decisions, would create “conditions that support
expression of the individual’s most mature moral thinking” (Colby &
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Kohlberg, 1987, p. 120 as cited in Krebs & Denton, 2005). Our results
suggest that if he had presented his participants with an emotional situation,
their responses may have been quite different.
However, our manipulation did not significantly change negative
emotion, as measured by the PANAS. People in the down-regulation
condition did not change their negative emotions any more or less than
people in the no-regulation condition. However, even though people in the
down-regulation condition did not change their emotions more than people
in the no-regulation condition, our manipulation succeeded in limiting the
change in abortion attitudes for the people who heard the down-regulation
instructions.
Problems and Future Directions
I attempted to test the first stage in Haidt’s model by instilling more
or less affect in my participants and observing how that differentially altered
their moral judgments. By observing how moral judgments changed based
solely on a change in affect, I attempted to ascertain whether emotion
precedes moral judgment or moral judgment precedes emotion. However,
the fourth link of Haidt’s (2001) thesis suggests that people care about the
social position of the persuader. I found that some of the participants’
abortion attitudes actually became more pro-choice as a result of the video.
Participants who thought that the video was trying to change their attitudes
might have not paid attention to the video – several of the participants
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actually mentioned that the most disgusting part of the video was that it was
trying to change their attitudes.
As mentioned before, I believe that the problem of emotion change
was not one of manipulation but one of assessment. Participants in the
down-regulation condition might have changed their emotion less, but a
ceiling effect, our inability to detect minute changes in emotion through the
PANAS, and introspective error might have hid the manipulation.
Therefore, a physiological measure of anger or disgust (e.g. sympathetic
nervous system activation or stomach contractions) might have eliminated
the measurement problems that I faced using the PANAS. I also might test
different emotion regulation instructions to determine the most successful
instructions for limiting negative emotions of moral situations. Even though
Gross (1998) tested similar instructions with a disgust inducing situation (he
used an amputated arm), I not only wanted to limit negative emotion, I also
wanted to limit negative emotion to a moral situation and observe how this
changed the participants’ moral stance. My video might have been too
emotionally arousing for our specific instructions.
For instance, 20-30 sec into the video, rather abruptly, a
disembodied fetus protruded from the mother covered in blood. As the
participants revealed in the open-ended questionnaire, the immediacy and
unexpectedness of the disgusting images might have instigated automatic
reactions before our participants had a chance to use any cognitive control
strategies to regulate their emotions. Furthermore, different attitude
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structures might have allowed some participants to better regulate their
emotions than other participants. Huskinson and Haddock (2004) found that
people who had high “Need for Cognition” scores and low “Need for
Affect” scores on a questionnaire evaluated objects in cognitive terms, while
people who had high “Need for Affect” scores and low “Need for
Cognition” scores evaluated objects in affective terms. They labeled the
first category as Cognitive Based Attitudes and the last category as
Affective Based Attitudes. Not surprisingly, they found that affective
persuasion techniques were more successful amongst people with a high
need for affect while cognitive persuasion techniques were more successful
amongst people with a high need for cognition (e.g. philosophers).
Moreover, as Haidt (2001) explained
Children start off with limited ability to resist temptation,
but as the hippocampus and frontal cortex finish their
development, children become more able to inhibit
impulsive behaviors. Some children start off with a more
effective cool system because of better or faster frontal
cortex development. Frontal cortex development makes
these children smarter, and they therefore perform better on
measures of moral reasoning, but their improved moral
behavior comes more from their greater self-regulatory
abilities than from their greater moral reasoning abilities.
p. 823
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Future studies should assess the difference between a cognitive disposition
and an affective disposition in emotion regulation strategies as it applies to
moral situations. Some people (e.g., philosophers or academics) might have
more training in analyzing emotional situations than other people. If I
compared people with a cognitive disposition to people with an emotional
disposition, I might find that people who have a cognitive disposition are
better able to implement the cognitive regulation strategies required to
override their initial emotional reactions.
Conclusion
Haidt’s (2001) thesis generally held, and moral emotions related to
opinions of a moral issue. Furthermore, just by telling participants to
regulate their emotions, I found that those participants were persuaded less
by a moral video. However, more research needs to be done assessing the
specific ways of changing moral emotions and the specific dispositions
better able to regulate emotions. Haidt, Kohler, and Dias (1993) found that
college students from America decided that an act was wrong based on
whether or not it harmed somebody; however, they also found that this
effect was more pronounced in academic situations. To actually assess the
constructs of disgust and other moral emotions as they relate to moral
decisions, we need to leave academia and test participants in real situations.
Kohlberg’s main assessment problems were his insistence on presenting
participants with artificial and hypothetical situations and judging how they
would react in every situation based on those assessments. Instead of
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testing participants in a similar situation (e.g. a psychological research lab
watching a video), we need to put participants in situations where they
would have to make the moral decisions that we are asking them to judge.
Only then could we know whether they truly believe their attitudes.
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1. Abortion should be legal.

2. Abortions should be legal in the case of incest.

3. Abortions should be legal in the case of rape.

4. Abortion should be equally available regardless of income.

5. Abortion should be legal when the mother’s health is in danger.

6. Abortion should be available through public health clinics.

7. The law has no right to tell a woman what to do with her body.
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8. Abortions should be legal if birth control fails.

9. The United Way should support agencies which provide abortions.

10. Federal, state, or local tax money should be used to provide
abortions.

11. Abortion is murder.

12. Abortion is against my beliefs.

13. Life exists from the moment of conception.

14. Abortion is a sin against God.
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15. A fetus is a human being.

16. A fetus should have legal rights.

17. Abortion after the first trimester is murder.

18. Abortion should be entirely the woman’s decision.

19. The father should have the right to prevent the mother from having
an abortion.

20. A woman should have to tell the father before having an abortion.
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Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
1. I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions.
1

2

3

4

strongly
disagree

5
strongly
agree

2. I know immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry.
1

2

3

4

strongly
disagree

5
strongly
agree

3. I can often feel my heart beating.
1

2

3

4

strongly
disagree

5
strongly
agree

4. I am quick to sense the hunger contractions of my stomach.
1

2

3

4

strongly
disagree

5
strongly
agree

5. I am very aware of changes in my body temperature.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5
strongly
agree
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We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular,
how you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. We are interested in
two aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you
feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each
item, please answer using the following scale:
1-------------------------2------------------------------3--------------------------4---------------------------5
Strongly
Neutral
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1. ____

When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or
amusement), I change what I’m thinking about.

2. ____

I keep my emotions to myself.

3. ____

When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I
change what I’m thinking about.

4. ____

When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.

5. ____

When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it
in a way that helps me stay calm.

6. ____

I control my emotions by not expressing them.

7. ____

When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m
thinking about the situation.

8. ____
I’m in.

I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation

9. ____

When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.

10. ____

When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m
thinking about the situation.
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Appendix B
Figures

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

Figure 1. The social intuitionist model of moral judgments. The numbered
links, drawn for Person A only, are (1) the intuitive judgment link, (2) the
post hoc reasoning link, (3) the reasoned persuasion link, and (4) the social
persuasion link. Two additional links are hypothesized to occur less
frequently: (5) the reasoned judgment link and (6) the private reflection link.
From “The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach
to moral judgment,” by J. Haidt, 2001, Psychological Review, 108, p. 818.

50

1

2

3

Time Point

Figure 2. Mean abortion attitudes by condition. The vertical axis represents
scores on the abortion attitudes questionnaire, in thousands, starting from
8000 and ending at 14000. The horizontal axis represents the time that the
participant filled out the questionnaire. The diamond shape represents the
up-regulation condition, the triangle shape represents the down-regulation
condition, and the square shape represents the no-regulation condition

